Material Contribution, Responsibility, and Liability by Barry, Christian
 Material contribution, responsibility, and liability 
 
In her inventive and tightly argued book Defensive Killing,1 Helen Frowe defends the view 
that bystanders—those who do not pose threats to others—cannot be liable to being 
harmed in self-defence or in defence of others. On her account, harming bystanders 
always infringes their rights against being harmed, since they have not acted in any way to 
forfeit them. According to Frowe, harming bystanders can be justified only when it 
constitutes a lesser evil.2  In this brief essay, I make the case that some bystanders can 
indeed be liable to harm. They can be liable, I will argue, because they can be morally 
responsible for threats of harm, and in becoming responsible they can forfeit their rights. 
While bystanders cannot be responsible for initiating threats, they can become 
responsible for the persistence of threats, and for culpably failing to prevent them from 
being initiated in the first place.  
 
Permissible Killing and Liability 
 
Central to Frowe’s account of defensive killing is the distinction between threats and 
bystanders on the one hand, and between direct and indirect threats on the other. Direct 
and indirect threats of harm will, if that harm eventuates, have materially contributed to 
harm. Bystanders, on the other hand, are materially innocent (24, 37), regardless—
according to Frowe—of their intentions or dispositions. Material innocence is defined in 
terms of causality: ‘The materially innocent are those who are not noncentes: not causing 
harm’ (24‒5). 
                                                 
1 Helen Frowe, Defensive Killing (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014). All in-text page references are to 
this work. 
2 She argues that there are significant restrictions on the use of such justification for harming bystanders—
we must be willing to take on significant cost to ourselves to avoid harming bystanders: ‘In cases where 
Victim will avert even very serious harm only to himself (or one other innocent person), my account will 
not permit him to inflict more than a moderate cost upon a bystander’ (10). 
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  Whether and how an agent is on track to materially contribute to some harm is 
relevant to whether they can be harmed to prevent it, and whether they can be liable to 
such harm. To illustrate, consider four cases in which agents are present when some 
harm may befall a person (Vicky). 
In Case 1 Dirk pushes a heavy cart downhill towards Vicky. Dirk poses a threat 
to Vicky. And the threat is direct, by Frowe’s criteria, since (1) if the cart collides with 
Vicky and she dies from its impact, Dirk will have killed her; and (2) there is no 
intervening agency between his pushing of the cart and her death.  
 
 
 
In Case 2, Ella removes a rock that would otherwise stop a cart that is hurtling 
downhill toward Vicky. Frowe does not discuss this sort of case. Hence, it is not entirely 
clear whether on her account the threat Ella poses counts as a direct or indirect threat. 
Ella acts in a way that will lead to Vicky’s death, and there is no intervening agency 
between her removal of the rock and Vicky’s death. But, unlike Dirk, she does not use 
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 something as a tool to kill Vicky. Does Ella kill Vicky or does she merely endanger her? 
Some may say that she does kill her, though others may resist and instead claim that her 
contribution to Vicky’s death is that she allows or enables it to occur. It would be 
instructive to hear what Frowe thinks of agents who contribute to harm in this way, but 
since she does not focus on them, I will not discuss such cases at length.  
 
 Then consider Case 3. Unlike Dirk and Ella, Ollie neither initiates the threat of 
the onrushing cart, nor removes an obstacle that would otherwise block it. However, by 
virtue of his location he prevents Vicky from escaping. One of the novel (and, to my 
mind, entirely convincing) aspects of Frowe’s view is that she regards Ollie (the 
obstructor) as posing a threat, rather than as a mere bystander. She writes: ‘it is a mistake 
to think that obstructors are bystanders’ (22). In what sense does Ollie pose a threat? He 
poses a threat because his presence prevents Vicky’s escape. Were he not present, she 
could avoid the cart without difficulty and without anyone being harmed. The threat that 
Ollie poses is indirect. If Vicky dies from the impact of the cart, Ollie will not have killed 
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 her, but he will have endangered her. And because of this, Ollie may be liable to being 
killed by Vicky to save herself.  
 
 
 In Case 4, finally, Alice is standing on the side of a hill, where a cart is hurtling 
down towards Vicky.  
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Responsibility 
Frowe’s distinctions between types of threats and between threats and bystanders are the 
first plank of her account of liability to harm and permissible killing. The second plank 
concerns the responsibility of those who pose threats. Whether Ollie, Ella and Dirk are 
liable to be killed, on her view, depends on their degree of responsibility for the threats 
that they pose.  
Agents who are wholly non-responsible for threats cannot be liable to be killed or 
harmed in self-defence. An agent can be non-responsible for threats either because they 
did not exercise their agency at all in posing it—as when a person is thrown off a 
building and may fall on someone standing below—or because they have the reasonable 
belief that any opportunity to avoid posing a threat would entail a cost sufficiently high 
that they would not be required to bear it to protect the prospective victim (11).  
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 Some simple terminology may help to elucidate this second notion of non-
responsibility. Call the cost that a person has a responsibility to shoulder to prevent harm 
from befalling another the required cost, and whatever cost a person would in fact need to 
shoulder to do so the necessary cost.  When an agent reasonably believes that the necessary 
cost of avoiding posing a threat to another exceeds the required cost of preventing the 
harm to which it may give rise, they are non-responsible for posing the threat. If, for 
example, I would have to lose a leg to avoid behaviour that would materially contribute 
to bruising your finger, I will be non-responsible for the threat of bruising your finger, 
insofar as I am not required to bear so high a cost to prevent this harm to you. If, on the 
other hand, I need only sustain a bruised finger to avoid initiating a threat that would 
cause you to lose your leg, I will be responsible for this threat.  
 The issues of material contribution and responsibility are not only relevant to 
assessments of liability to harm—harming without infringing rights— but to permissible 
harming more generally. Frowe maintains that agents posing direct threats needn’t be 
responsible for it to be permissible to kill them in self-defence (even though they are 
non-liable). So even if Dirk is non-responsible for the threat he poses, Vicky can 
nevertheless kill him in self-defence. Vicky cannot, however, kill indirect threats like Ollie 
to save herself if he is wholly non-responsible for the threat he poses, nor can she kill 
bystanders like Alice.  
On Frowe’s account, whether the necessary cost of refraining from posing a 
threat exceeds the required cost depends not only on the magnitude of the threat (the 
harm to which it will give rise), but its nature (74). Prospective direct threats, like Dirk, 
are required to bear more cost to avoid posing threats than prospective indirect threats 
like Ollie. Ollie is required to bear ‘non-trivial’ but not high costs to avoid posing the 
indirect threat to Vicky (74). The required cost of Dirk’s avoiding pushing the cart down 
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 to Vicky is higher than the required cost of Ollie’s refraining from sitting on the path 
where he knows he will obstruct Vicky’s escape.  
So far, we’ve been discussing the required cost of refraining from initiating a 
threat. Whether the required cost exceeds the necessary cost will determine whether an 
agent is responsible for initiating a threat. But we can also consider the question of 
required cost from a different angle: the required cost of intervening to prevent a threat 
resulting in harm. Suppose that these agents have already posed the threat (Dirk has 
pushed the cart, Ella has removed the rock, Ollie has sat down on the path). We can now 
ask how much cost they would be required to bear to prevent the cart from hitting 
Vicky, in case they could now intervene to do so? All else being equal, Frowe’s view 
implies that Dirk is required to shoulder more cost to avert the threat than Ollie. 
Whether the required cost of intervention exceeds the necessary cost will determine 
whether an agent is responsible for the persistence of the threat.  
Finally, we can consider the notion of required cost from a third angle: 
enforcement. Here, we ask how much cost could be imposed upon the agents—in terms 
of preventing them from initiating a threat or compelling them not to allow it to 
persist—to stop their conduct from maturing into harm to Vicky, without wronging 
them. Here Frowe implies that, all else being equal, we could impose more cost on Dirk 
than on Ollie for these purposes. Agents who pose threats are not only responsible for 
them, but more or less culpable with respect to them. That is, there is a difference 
between someone who fails to take advantage of a reasonable opportunity to avoid 
posing a threat and one who intentionally does not do so—the latter person is liable to 
more harm than the former, relative to what is at stake (83). Consequently, a very 
culpable indirect threat may be liable to be killed in self-defence (25).  
The distinction between initiating a threat and being relevant to its persistence 
suggests, I think, that agents can start out as non-responsible for threats they pose, but 
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 become responsible for them later. Suppose that Dirk initiates a threat involuntarily—he 
was pushed up against the cart and it consequently starts rolling downhill. Dirk is initially 
wholly non-responsible for the threat. But suppose Dirk now realizes that, with a 
minimum of effort, he can push a button next to him that will cause a fence to spring up 
in front of Vicky, stopping the cart from continuing downhill and protecting her from its 
impact. Suppose that for no good reason he fails to do this. In this case, it seems 
plausible that he becomes responsible for the persistence of the threat, even though he 
was non-responsible for its initiation. And it also seems that, while he may not have been 
liable to being harmed to protect Vicky as he was poised to initiate the threat, he now 
does seem liable to being harmed for his role in its persistence.  
So too with Ollie. Suppose that he initially at t1 sits down on the spot where he 
blocks Vicky’s escape.. Imagine that at this point he is entirely innocent of the threat he 
poses to Vicky (he does not know, and could not reasonably be expected to know, that 
she is under threat by a cart on its way downhill.)  Imagine that, shortly afterwards at t2, 
the situation becomes transparent to him; he is able to remove himself at very trivial cost 
from the spot where he is blocking Vicky’s escape, but fails to do so. Here Ollie seems 
initially non-responsible for a threat, but becomes responsible because it persists due to his 
culpable failure to move. While he was not liable to being harmed to prevent him from 
occupying the place where he put Vicky under threat, he can become liable by failing to 
prevent the threat when he could do so at little cost.   
 
Bystanders 
 
So far, we’ve considered cases of people who, on Frowe’s account, pose threats and thus 
can become material contributors to harm. Let’s now return to Alice. Alice is not a 
threat. Her agency has played no role in initiating the threat to Vicky. Nor does Alice’s 
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 presence prevent Vicky from escaping. (It is even, perhaps, good for Vicky that Alice is 
present on the scene, since she may offer the opportunity of avoiding the threat from 
maturing into harm.) Alice is a paradigmatic bystander, in Frowe’s sense. The 
bystander/threat distinction is, for Frowe, non-moralised: “we can and ought to establish 
whether a person is a threat or a bystander independently of her moral innocence or 
responsibility” (24). What distinguishes bystanders is that they are materially innocent 
with respect to threats., Frowe defines the notion of material innocence in terms of 
causal relevance (24‒5). Alice is materially innocent with respect to the threat Vicky faces 
because she plays no causal role in it. Frowe argues that bystanders like Alice, in addition 
to being materially innocent, cannot in any way be responsible for threats. Indeed, she 
writes, ‘the idea of a responsible bystander is not only unattractive but conceptually 
incoherent’ (28).  
 
Culpable Bystanders and Responsibility 
 
Frowe’s arguments regarding the non-liability of bystanders rely on two premises. The 
first is that bystanders are ‘materially’ innocent, since they are not causing harm (24). The 
second is that, material innocence aside, they are not responsible for threats to victims.  
Frowe recognizes that bystanders can of course be culpable in various ways—they may 
harbour bad intentions or may even have made clumsy and inept attempts to harm 
people. The key, according to her, is that bystanders ‘are not doing (nor have they done) 
anything with respect to the threat to Victim for which blame would be appropriate.…. 
There is thus nothing with respect to the threat to Victim for which a bystander can be 
morally responsible.’ (24) I’ll consider each of these premises in turn. 
 
Material Innocence 
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 Are all bystanders materially innocent? To answer this we need to know whether 
bystanders like Alice can plausibly be regarded as causally relevant to harms that befall 
victims like Vicky. Here it is important to distinguish between two classes of people 
Frowe would regard as bystanders. Imagine the cart slams into Vicky, injuring her. In the 
first scenario, Alice not only played no role in initiating the threat, but was at no point in 
a position to prevent the threat from maturing into a harm (we could imagine that a high 
fence bars her from intervening to protect Vicky).  Frowe’s diagnosis of this sort of 
bystander seems entirely apt. There really is no way that Alice can or could have acted 
that will prevent the cart from crashing into Vicky. Consequently, the harm that befalls 
Vicky does not depend in any way on Alice’s conduct. Suppose that the cart hits Vicky 
and we are asked how Alice was responsible for it. Here we can truly say that she was not 
relevant to it in virtue of either what she has done or what she has failed to do, since 
there was nothing she could do to prevent it. It makes no sense to say of such a 
bystander that she allowed the harm to occur—she just happened to be nearby when it 
took place. She was responsible neither for initiating the threat nor for its persistence.  
Let’s turn to a second scenario. Like Alice, Abel played no role in initiating the 
threat—he was simply positioned on the hill nearby.  
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Unlike Alice, however, Abel becomes aware that he can intervene, thereby 
preventing the threat from maturing into a harm (he spots a button nearby that he knows 
will trigger the protective fence to spring up, just like Dirk in our earlier example). If 
Abel then fails to press the button, he will have allowed harm to occur to Vicky. In this 
case the harm she suffers is counterfactually dependent on Abel’s conduct. It depends 
not on what he did, but on what he could have but didn’t do.  
Frowe discusses a structurally similar case, Drowning Child. 
 
“Walker passes a lake on her morning stroll. Child is drowning in the lake. 
Walker observes Child's predicament, and does nothing to help Child, even 
though she could easily save her. Child drowns.” (29) 
 
Frowe argues that, although Walker is culpable in this case, this is not because of her role 
as a bystander, given that she didn't contribute to the threat. Thus, she argues that 
Walker is not culpable qua bystander (indeed she could have saved the child while 
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 remaining a bystander). Rather, Walker is culpable because she violated a duty to save the 
child. (30) But whether or not bystanders like Abel and Walker should be characterized 
as culpable bystanders, the critical question is whether bystanders who fail to help others 
when they have a duty to do so should be considered materially innocent with respect to 
the harms they fail to prevent? Since, as we have seen, this is a question of causal 
relevance, our answer will depend on the account of causation we employ. According to 
many counterfactual accounts of causation, Abel will count as a cause of Vicky’s death. 
Such accounts maintain that we can be causally responsible through our omissions as 
well as through our actions—a doctor’s failure to treat a patient can cause the patient’s 
death.3 As Jonathan Bennett has pointed out in discussion of a similar case, Abel’s non-
intervention is essential to completing the causally sufficient conditions for the cart’s 
crashing into Vicky, given the description of the initial setup.4 The fact that he does not 
push the button is a crucial part of the story of why she is harmed, given his position on 
the hill and has capacity to prevent it. The same is true of Walker in Drowning Child. 
Abel is not physically connected to Vicky. But on counterfactual accounts causes 
need not be physically linked to their effects.5 On such accounts, then, bystanders like 
Abel are not materially innocent of the harm that befalls Vicky, while bystanders like 
Alice are. Arguing against such a view, Frowe could claim that genuine causes are 
physically connected to their effects. Here the contrast between Dirk and Abel is clear—
Dirk initiates a continuous causal sequence by transferring energy to the cart. He is 
linked to Vicky’s injuries by a complete causal process. This process is a physical one—a 
                                                 
3 Carolina Sartorio, ‘Causation and Responsibility’, Philosophy Compass 2 (5) (2007), pp. 749‒65, at p. 753. 
4 Jonathan Bennett, The Act Itself (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 129. 
5 Jonathan Schaffer, ‘Causes Need Not Be Physically Connected to Their Effects: The Case for Negative 
Causation’, in Christopher Hitchcock (ed.), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Science (Oxford: Blackwell, 
2004), pp. 197‒216. See also David Lewis ‘Void and Object’, in J. Collins, N. Hall and L. A. Paul (eds), 
Causation and Counterfactuals (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2004), pp. 277–90. 
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 complete energy momentum sequence connects Dirk’s movement to the cart’s collision 
with Vicky.6  
Interesting variants of this approach have been developed in the causation 
literature.7 But there are also serious challenges to it. First, there are many other cases in 
which causes are not physically connected to their effects, but nevertheless seem to be 
genuine cases of causation. Ella, in our earlier example, is one such case. Ella is relevant 
to the harm to Vicky by removing something that will stop it. It would be very 
counterintuitive to deny that Ella is causally relevant to Vicky’s death, even though there 
is no continuous casual sequence linking them.8 Further, we’ve seen that Frowe does 
regard Ollie as a threat and a material contributor to the harm that would befall Vicky. 
But Ollie is not physically connected to Vicky’s death via a continuous casual sequence. 
Let’s assume, however, the view that causes must be physically connected to their 
effects. Bystanders like Abel, then, would be treated as causally non-responsible for 
harms that they allow. We can nevertheless maintain that, although Abel did not cause 
harm to Vicky, he failed to do something that would have causally prevented it from 
occurring. Following Carolina Sartorio, I’ll call connections of this sort quasi-causal, and 
regard Abel as quasi-causally responsible for the harm to Vicky.9  
The question then is why causal responsibility, as opposed to quasi-causal 
responsibility, should be the relevant condition for being regarded as potentially 
responsible for a threat. After all, we seem to attribute moral responsibility to many 
                                                 
6 Ned Hall refers to this kind of causal connection as exhibiting ‘locality’: Ned Hall, ‘Non-Locality on the 
Cheap? A New Problem for Counterfactual Analyses of Causation’, Noûs 36, no. 2 (2002): 276–94; Ned 
Hall, ‘Two Concepts of Causation’, in J. Collins, N. Hall and L. A. Paul (eds), Causation and Counterfactuals 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2004), 225–76. 
7 Phil Dowe, ‘Why Preventers and Omissions Are Not Causes’, in Christopher Hitchcock 
(ed.), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Science  (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004), pp.189-96, David Fair, 
‘Causation and the Flow of Energy’, Erkenntnis 14 (1979), pp. 219‒50. 
8 For detailed discussion, see Jonathan Schaffer, ‘Causation by Disconnection’. Philosophy of Science 67 
(2000), pp. 285–300. 
9 Sartorio, ‘Causation and Responsibility’, pp. 752‒4. 
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 agents who are physically disconnected from their effects, whether or not we consider 
them causally responsible. We bear responsibility for the death of a friend’s dog if we 
promised to feed it while they were away, but simply didn’t show up; we bear 
responsibility for a person’s death if we provide the wrong address to emergency services 
that seek to attend them.  Why should quasi-causal responsibility be insufficient to make 
a person potentially responsible for a threat? Whether agents that are quasi-causally 
responsible for threats are responsible for them would depend on further factors, in 
particular whether the necessary cost of intervening to prevent harm exceeds the 
required cost, an issue to which I now turn. Either bystanders can be materially non-
innocent with respect to threats of harm or material innocence is not a plausible 
condition for responsibility for threats. 
  
Non-responsibility 
How could Abel be responsible for the threat that Vicky faces? As Frowe rightly points 
out, ‘not just any wrongdoing will render a person a morally responsible bystander whom 
Victim can permissibly kill’ (27). If Abel has cheated on his spouse or harmed other 
people in the past, that does not make him responsible for the threat that Vicky now 
faces. In this case, he is certainly not responsible for initiating the threat.  
It is worth pointing out, though, that there may be scenarios in which bystanders 
can be responsible, in some measure, for the initiation of the threat. Suppose Abel spots 
Dirk walking along at the top of the hill at t-1-x. He realizes that Dirk is at risk of 
stumbling into the cart at t1 (he knows, though Dirk does not, that there is a soft patch of 
ground that he is likely to slip on). Abel knows that all he needs to do is to shout out to 
Dirk—‘watch out for the soft spot!’—and he will not stumble into the cart and send it 
down towards Vicky. At t1-X the lethal threat of onrushing cart has not yet been initiated.  
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 If it is initiated at t1, it will be because of Abel’s culpable failure to warn Dirk at very little 
cost previously. 
Then, too, Abel may be responsible for the threat insofar as he becomes 
responsible for its persistence. Just as Dirk, Ella or Ollie could be responsible for the 
threat in the cases discussed above, if there is a point at which, without taking on undue 
cost, Abel can intervene to prevent the threat from maturing into a harm and does not 
do so, he is responsible for the persistence of the threat. Suppose that he can prevent the 
cart from hitting Vicky by simply pressing the fence-erecting button in the interval 
between time t1 and t2, but he fails to do so. Assume that the situation is completely 
transparent to him. He is fully aware that the costs to him involved in preventing Vicky’s 
death are negligible. In this case it seems plausible to regard Abel as bearing 
responsibility for the threat Vicky faces at time t3. He is responsible because Vicky’s 
predicament at t3 results in part from his earlier failure to take on cost that he was 
required to bear to protect her. Whereas at t1 Vicky’s predicament does not depend in 
any way on Abel’s failure to take on cost he was required to bear, this is the case at t3. So 
while it is true that Abel was not initially responsible for the threat posed to Vicky, he has 
become responsible for the persistence of the threat. 
Abel is, in this respect, clearly quite different from other bystanders who engage 
in wrongdoing, such as those who may be cheating on their spouses or their tax returns 
(28). He wrongs Vicky by failing to prevent her from being harmed when he is morally 
required to do so.10 That is not true of the many other people in the world who are 
engaged in wrongdoing of various sorts.  
  Of course, the arguments sketched above assume that bystanders like Abel must 
initially bear at least some cost to prevent harm from occurring to other innocent people.  
                                                 
10 The same is true of Walker with respect to the child in Drowning Child—she acts culpably when 
failing to prevent the child’s death. 
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 I assume that Frowe would agree that agents who are bystanders are required to take on 
at least trivial costs to save others in (emergency) situations of the sort we have been 
discussing.11 Abel must intervene to prevent Vicky’s death if he will bear only a very 
trivial cost such as muddying his trousers, pressing a button, using his vocal chords, or 
perhaps suffering a small bruise. Many would think that the required cost would be 
greater still.   This is entirely consistent with maintaining that the cost Abel must bear 
would be less than what could be required of those who, like Ollie, Ella or Dirk, do or 
enable harm, or prevent others from escaping it. Indeed, there is a rationale for regarding 
Abel as different from these others. Whereas Vicky could say of the others that she was 
doing just fine before they came along, she cannot say this of Abel. This is true even if 
Abel could have acted to avert the initiation of the threat in the first place (for example, 
by warning Dirk.) So giving up on the idea that bystanders cannot be responsible for 
threats does not mean that they lack special moral status.  
 Suppose that, despite being aware that he can protect Vicky at trivial cost, Abel 
remains unwilling to shoulder any cost to prevent harm to her. In that case, it seems 
plausible that cost could be permissibly imposed on him by Vicky in self-defence, or by 
others insofar as this was a necessary side effect of protecting Vicky. Moreover, Abel 
seems liable to bear this cost. If Vicky could now prevent her own death by imposing a 
bruised finger on Abel, she could do so without wronging him. After all, this was cost 
Abel was required to bear in the first place in order to protect her, and he could have 
protected her at much less cost even than this!  
Just how much cost could Vicky impose on Abel? This would seem to depend on 
Abel’s degree of culpability for the persistence of the threat. If his inaction resulted from 
the fact that he just didn’t care about Vicky’s plight and preferred to remain undisturbed 
with his picnic on the hill, he might be liable to less harm than if he actively welcomed 
                                                 
11 Frowe’s discussion of Drowning Child suggests that she affirms positive duties to rescue. 
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 Vicky’s death or was disposed to bring it about in some other way had the cart not 
fortuitously been on track to kill her. What seems clear, however, is that Abel is liable to 
bear more cost than was initially required of him. Suppose that the means of protecting 
Vicky at trivial cost (for example, by pressing the button) during the interval between t1 
and t2 are now no longer available. At t3 it will now cost substantially more to save her. In 
this case Abel’s decision not to causally interfere with the threat to Vicky during the 
interval t1–t2, when doing so was not at all costly, has led to a situation where someone—
either Abel or Vicky (or both in some measure)—must suffer a loss that is greater than 
anyone need have suffered previously. Since this increase in the cost of saving Vicky 
results from Abel’s culpable failure to assist, it seems only fair that he rather than she 
should bear the cost. 
 
  
Killing Bystanders 
 
So far our discussion has focused on whether bystanders can be liable to being harmed, 
and whether it is permissible to harm them. But Frowe’s book is concerned primarily 
with one very serious sort of harm to others—killing. Perhaps it remains impermissible 
to kill bystanders in self-defence. Or perhaps they cannot become liable to being killed, 
even if they can be liable to lesser harms.  
Let’s consider permissibility first. As we’ve noted, Frowe holds that we can 
permissibly kill innocent threats in self-defence. That is, if Dirk involuntarily initiates a 
threat to Vicky—he is blown into a cart, sending it downhill towards Vicky—she can 
permissibly kill Dirk to save herself—say as an unavoidable side-effect of preventing it 
from hitting her—so long as this was necessary. In this case, he would be killed 
permissibly, without being liable to be killed. Now imagine that Abel is also on the scene. 
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 Unlike Dirk, he played no role in initiating the threat. But he did have an opportunity to 
prevent its persistence by effortlessly pushing the fence-triggering button next to him. 
Vicky now has two options for protecting herself: she can kill Dirk as a side-effect of 
saving herself or she can kill Abel as a side-effect (she can shoot at the button in front of 
him, which will trigger the fence but continue on and kill Abel). I submit that if it is 
permissible to kill Dirk, it should also be permissible to kill Abel. After all, it is only Abel 
who has failed in an obligation to Vicky, and it is because of this failure that she will face 
her death. Dirk has done nothing with respect to the threat which he has initiated, while 
Abel has.   
 Is Abel liable to be killed? Here I think his degree of culpability is crucial. If the 
situation is fully transparent to him and he repeatedly refused to take on the trivial cost 
of preventing this very serious harm—say because he welcomes Vicky’s death and would 
be disposed to bring it about himself—his claim to protection is dramatically reduced. 
Even if we are unsure whether even very culpable bystanders are liable to be killed when 
the life of only one innocent person is at stake, it seems implausible that they would not 
be liable when many are at stake. If Abel can save the lives of 20 innocent people in the 
situation as described, does he really not forfeit his right against being killed insofar as 
this is necessary to protect the victims? Does he retain his right to defend himself against 
the 20 should they take defensive action against him, when his culpable failure to prevent 
harm is the reason why anyone must now be harmed? 
 Frowe worries that introducing a category of responsible bystanders will 
“undermine the idea that bystanders are off limits.”(28) This is a reasonable concern. 
Note, however, that the arguments presented above only affirm that agents who very 
culpably fail to prevent serious harms can be liable to defensive harm. Situations are 
rarely so transparent to bystanders as they are in the case of Abel considered above. 
Moreover, the costs to bystanders of preventing harm to others are typically non-trivial. 
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 For these reasons, few bystanders will in practice be liable to be killed in self-defence or 
in defence of others. Allowing for the category of responsible bystanders does not, as 
Frowe suggests, mean that describing a person as a bystander lacks implications for how 
we are required to treat her (43). Whereas those who pose threats make people worse off 
than were they to be absent from the scene altogether—Vicky would be safe were Dirk, 
Ella, or Ollie not to be present— this is not true of bystanders.  Because the presence of 
bystanders on the scene at which a person has been placed under threat of harm has not 
made that person worse off, the circumstances under which bystanders can be required 
to bear cost to protect those under threat are much more limited.  We can only impose 
significant costs on bystanders to protect others under threat without wronging them if 
they have culpably failed to prevent the threat from coming about in the first place, or to 
prevent its persistence.  
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